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In this Article, I defend the view that natural resources originally belong
to individuals who have legitimately established private property claims
over them. Natural resources do not belong to a collective entity such as
the people or the state. My argument is simple. Relying on the Lockean
contractarian tradition, I argue that individuals must delegate any resource
controlled by the state. This is because all powers of the state are, morally,
delegated powers. A group's claims over natural resources is entirely
derivative of the original claims of its members. Only individuals can
originally appropriate natural resources; only they have the right to use or
sell them, to the state or others.
I proceed as follows. First, I discuss the international law rule according
to which peoples or states have permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
Second, I attempt to clarify what are natural resources and who is the right-
holder. Third, I present my argument for rejecting the above-mentioned
rule: for moral and empirical reasons, title on natural resources should be
vested in individuals, not in peoples or states. I conclude with a discussion
of common ownership, the view that global natural resources are owned,
not by states or individuals, but by humanity as a whole. I indicate the reasons
why that position should be rejected as well.
I. THE STATE AS OWNER: THE RULE OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY
OVER NATURAL RESOURCES
International lawyers accept the principle of Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources ("the Rule"). The Rule appears in a number of
international documents. The International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights provides: "All peoples may, for their own ends, freely
dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any
obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon
the principle of mutual benefit, and international law."' The original source,
UN General Assembly Resolution 1803, reads: "The right of peoples and
nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources
must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the
well-being of the people of the State concerned.",2 Finally, the Rule can
be found in the so-called Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
which, like Resolution 1803, is a non-binding resolution by the United
1. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), at 49 (Dec. 16, 1966).
2. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), at 15 (Dec. 14, 1962).
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Nations General Assembly: "Every State has and shall freely exercise full
permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its
wealth, natural resources and economic activities."
3
There is little doubt that the Rule, under a traditional positivist analysis,
is accepted as a principle of international law.4 The Rule has been endorsed
even by capitalist states that recognize private property have endorsed the
Rule. The underlying idea is that international law is supposed to be agnostic
among economic regimes. The formulation in the Rule that the state may
freely dispose of natural resources means, in part, that the state has the
discretion to nationalize or privatize. 5 This Article, however, is not about
the legal status of the Rule, but about its moral status. It will argue that
the Rule is unjust because if fails to recognize the moral and economic
importance of private property rights.
The Rule has two parts. The first part purports to establish a collective
title: states, nations, or peoples have a permanent right over natural resources.
This title excludes other states, nations, or peoples. The second part is a
rule of good governance: it enjoins governments of those entities,
who supposedly act on behalf of the people, to exercise this right for the
development and well-being of the people.6 The Rule appears in national
constitutions as well. The Mexican Constitution, for example, proclaims:
"The property of all land and water within national territory is originally
owned by the Nation, who has the right to transfer this ownership to
particulars. Hence, private property is a privilege created by the Nation."
7
More specifically: "All natural resources in national territory are property
of the nation, and private exploitation may only be carried out through
3. Id.
4. See generally NICO SCHRIJVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES:
BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES (1997).
5. See G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), at 15 (Dec. 14, 1962); see generally Peter Leon &
Webber Wentzle, International Best Practice and Resource Nationalism, Address Before
the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy School
(Oct. 10, 2010) (discussing the impact of resource nationalism in developing countries).
6. See Doroth~e Cambou & Stefaan Smis, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources from a Human Rights Perspective: Natural Resources Exploitation and Indigenous
Peoples'Rights in the Arctic, 22 MICH. ST. INT'L L. REV. 347, 359 (2013).
7. Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, art. 27, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DOF] 02-05-1917, iltimas reformas DOF 07-10-2015 (Mex.).
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concessions." 8 But the Rule is older than Mexico or the United Nations. 9
The old English common law of property includes the traditional notion
of imperium, according to which the Crown had the ultimate title over
land and resources.' 0 Under the Rule, states are free to establish any system
of property in resources. Natural resources belong to the state.
Several political philosophers have accepted the idea. Leif Wenar, for
example, argues that the people collectively own the resources in the territory,
and that any trade or utilization of resources by the government must have
been delegated democratically by the people.'" Cara Nine writes that
collective entities are the proper agents of acquisition of resources, and
that those collective entities are the trans-generational managers of natural
resources. 12 In any of these versions, private property rights are mere
conventions that may be adopted or rejected for reasons of utility. 3 The
state is not obligated to recognize any private property rights.
In its modem incarnation, the Rule traces its origins to the process of
decolonization.' 4 In that context, it made eminent sense. It reflected a
justified reaction against the European colonial practice of appropriating
the resources of the colonies. Modern international law rejects colonialism,
and with it, the notion that one state could colonize an entire society and
exploit that territory's resources for the colonizer's benefit. However, with
8. Id. The Argentine Constitution, interestingly, provides that the provinces (and
not the federal government) have original dominion over the natural resources in their
territories. Art. 2, § 124, CONSTITUCION NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.), http://www.
biblioteca.jus.gov.ar/argentina-constitution.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ELZ-9W5B].
9. The United Nations, founded in 1945, and the Mexican Constitution, 1917,
postdate the long established Rule that natural resources belong to the state. See
Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, art. 27, Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6n [DOF] 02-05-1917 (Mex.); Mats Ingulstad & Lucas Lixinski, Raw Materials,
Race, and Legal Regimes: The Development of the Principle of Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources in the Americas, WORLD HIST. BULL., Spring 2013, at 34, 34-35;
History of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/
[https://perma.cc/7NJ8-48EV] (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
10. For the historical development of the common law of property, see KENELM
DIGBY ASSISTED BY WILLIAM MONTAGU HARRISON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 5th ed. 1897).
11. Leif Wenar, Property Rights and the Resource Curse, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2,
9, 16, 19-20 (2008).
12. See CARA NINE, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND TERRITORY 72-93, 144 (2012); but see
David Miller, Territorial Rights: Concept and Justification, 60 POL. STUD. 252 (2012),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.con/doi/ 0.111 I/j. 1467-9248.2011.00911 .x/epdf [https://perma.cc/
8VTR-G9CZ]. Nine and Miller differ in the nature of the collective entity entitled to
appropriate resources. International lawyers unanimously endorse the Rule.
13. See Jeremy Waldron, Property and Ownership, STAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(Sept. 6, 2004), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/ [https://perma.cc/SF8M-U78X].
14. Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Role of International Law in Intrastate Natural
Resource Allocation: Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Peoples-Based Development, 45
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 785, 792-93 (2012).
1126
[VOL. 52: 1123, 2015] Revising International Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the end of colonization, the Rule morphed into the principle that collective
entities-peoples, nations, states-own the resources in their territory.' 5 That
idea in turn led naturally to the notion that governments have the
ultimate imperium over those resources, since governments are supposed
to act on behalf of the people. The Rule thus served to reaffirm the power
of the state over land and resources.
Thus, in its inception the Rule had a purely external dimension: it vested
title to resources in the collective entity in whose territory the resources
lay. It had the purpose of excludingforeigners, especially colonial powers,
from those resources. But with the end of colonization, the Rule acquired
an internal dimension as well.' 6 Under the Rule, the collective entity has
a title that is superior to whatever private property title the subjects could
assert. What was once an assertion of rights of the colonized people against
invaders now became an assertion of domestic governmental supremacy
against individual property claims. Private property rights, on this view, are
privileges granted by the state, as the Mexican constitution says. 17 The state
can legitimately expropriate resources because the state owns them in the first
place. Unlike, perhaps, other human rights, the right of private property, if
enforced in a territory, is not natural. It is a mere creation of the law. 8
The Rule has internal problems and ambiguities. I will examine two.
The first one is the question of exactly what are natural resources. The
second is the question of exactly who is the owner of natural resources.
A. What are Natural Resources?
The first puzzle is to figure out what natural resources are. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development defines natural
resources as "natural assets (raw materials) occurring in nature that can be
used for economic production or consumption."' 9 The Google dictionary
defines natural resources as "materials or substances such as minerals, forests,
15. See SCHRIJVER, supra note 4, at 166.
16. Id.
17. Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, art. 27, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DOF] 02-05-1917, 6]timas reformas DOF 07-10-2015 (Mex.).
18. The idea that property rights are merely conventional goes back to Hume and
is largely endorsed by modem political philosophers. See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS
NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE (2002). For reasons in the text (and
others that cannot be developed here) I reject this view.
19. Glossary of Statistical Terms: Natural Resources, OECD, https://stats.oecd.org/
glossary/detail.asp?lD=1740 [https://perma.cc/Y9RP-59SN] (last updated Dec. 2, 2005).
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water, and fertile land that occur in nature and can be used for economic
gain." Similarly, Chris Armstrong defines natural resources as "any raw
materials (matter or energy) which are not created by humans, but are
available to sustain human activities."2 In a lengthy treatment of the subject,
Nico Schrijver proposes the concepts of "natural wealth" and "natural
resources." Natural wealth comprises "those components in nature from
which natural resources can be extracted." Natural resources are, then,
"supplies drawn from natural wealth.., which can be used to satisfy the
needs of human beings and other living species."
21
Natural resources, then, occur in nature and are useful to humans. They
do not include manufactured goods, money, or similar non-natural objects.
Thus defined, natural resources include a vast range of goods, from oil to
tomatoes. Defenders of the Rule, however, rarely mention tomatoes. This
raises the problem of how to identify in a principled way the natural
resources subject to the Rule. One possibility is to say that the state owns
natural resources because it owns everything.22 The Rule would just be a
special case. In Argentina, for example, the government expropriated
individual retirement accounts worth $30 billion.23 This expropriation
cannot be justified under the Rule, since money is not found in nature.
The government must appeal to the more sweeping rule that the state owns
everything. Yet, from an economic standpoint, the distinction between
natural and non-natural resources is dubious. All things that have market
value are tradable. The point here is that the Rule is arbitrary. It might as
well say that the state owns everything, not just oil and minerals, and be
done with it.24 This is the position adopted by the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties when it decrees that every state has permanent sovereignty over
all its wealth and all economic activities.
Nor is the distinction between land and resources particularly helpful.
Chris Armstrong suggests that arguments for land and arguments for
resources should be separate because resources are removable from the
land, so we can intelligently ask questions whether rights over each should
20. Chris Armstrong, Against 'Permanent Sovereignty' over Natural Resources, 14
POL., PHIL. & ECON. 129, 144 (2015).
21. SCHRIJVER, supra note 4, at 19.
22. See discussion infra pp. 1131-33.
23. See Matt Moffett, Argentine Makes Grab for Pensions Amid Crisis, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 22, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122460155879054331
[https://perma.cc/DA5M-H5VD].
24. Schrijver says that including "economic activities" in the Rule adds nothing,
except the obvious fact that the state has "economic jurisdiction" in its territory. SCHRIJVER,
supra note 4, at 18-19.
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be allocated separately. 5 I find this claim unpersuasive. Suppose I
legitimately own my library, by which I mean the actual shelves and the
books in them. Of course, since each book is removable from the library,
it is possible to think of this or that book in the library as belonging to
someone else. But my claim over the library is not weakened by the fact
that books are removable. If it were established that one of the books in
the library is on loan, then it would be true that I do not own every book
in the library. But the reason is that someone actually has a better title
over the book, not that the book is removable. The same is true with
resources. Resources lay in the land, and the fact that resources are removable
from land is irrelevant for the purposes of title. The private law has well-
developed rules that apply equally to unmovable and movable objects, and
even to fugacious objects like oil.26 There is no reason why the private
owner's title over a resource should be lessened merely by its removability.
The owner's claim over resources is as strong or as weak as his claim over
land. If I own my backyard and also have gold laying there, my title over
each of those two resources is equally strong or weak. In order to own the
gold, someone must show a better title than the one the landowner has
over the gold-by virtue of owning the land. The mere fact that gold is
removable does not create such title.
27
Moreover, defenders of the Rule have failed to distinguish between
different types of resources. I grow tomatoes in my backyard and I have
also gold laying there. Tomatoes are also removable, yet I have not heard
many people making credible arguments for the view that the state owns
those tomatoes. The usual argument for the Rule focuses almost exclusively
on oil, minerals, water, and the like. It rarely focuses on tomatoes. One
common argument is that certain resources such as oil, minerals, forests,
25. Armstrong, supra note 20, at 131-32. Anna Stilz also excludes resources in her
argument for state territorial rights. See Anna Stilz, Nations, States, and Territory, 121
ETHICS 572, 574 n.3 (2011), htlp://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/StilzEthicsO.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5WT2-MFHQ]. David Miller, in contrast, treats them together, as do I.
See Miller, supra note 12, at 252-54.
26. For an early treatment of the common law, see Win. E. Colby, The Law of Oil
and Gas: A Consideration of Landowners' Rights, Particularly as Developed in California,
31 CALIF. L. REV. 357 (1943).
27. Perhaps all Armstrong means is that the fact that resources are removable from
land allows the possibility of assigning differential rights to land, on one hand, and
resources, on the other. But the law can assign differential rights even in objects that are
not separable. A tract of land, for example, can belong to two owners by undivided half,
and the bundle of rights of each may be different. Legal "removal" does not require physical
removal.
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and the like, are more important for development than farm products. I
find this argument specious. What is or is not important for development
depends on contingent economic factors such as the society's comparative
advantages. Some oil-rich countries are developed; others are not. So
why then identify only these particular resources? The real reason is that
the state wants my gold because it is particularly valuable. Tomatoes are
not, and thus can be left in private hands. Equally vacuous is the appeal
to the public interest. The state may decide that it is in the public interest
to leave the tomatoes in private hands, while it is in the public interest to
nationalize gold. But of course, this is just another way of saying that the
state wants the gold while it is not particularly interested in tomatoes.
There is no separate argument showing why grabbing the gold is in the
public interest. In fact, if economists are right, other things being equal,
leaving resources like oil and minerals in private hands would be more
efficient, and therefore truly in the public interest.
The scope of the Rule, therefore, is unclear. If, as the Charter of Economic
Rights says, the state owns all wealth, then of course it owns natural resources
and the Rule is superfluous. If instead the Rule covers only natural resources,
then it is unclear how one is supposed to distinguish between many different
things that occur in nature. This indeterminacy, of course, is not fatal to
supporters of the Rule. They may claim that the state owns everything
and the Rule is just a special case, or that the state owns natural resources
and has the discretion to expropriate whatever resources the state judges
to serve the public interest, or to assign private property rights in them.
B. Who is the Right-Holder under the Rule?
The three documents quoted at the beginning of the Article answer this
question differently. The owners of natural resources are nations, peoples,
or states. The term nation either has no meaning in international law, or
it is co-terminus with "people or state." I will therefore discuss peoples and
states as candidates for owners of natural resources under the Rule.
According to the Covenant, the right-holders are peoples rather than
states.28 There are two conceptions ofpeople. The first one is the nationalist
conception; the second is the collectivist conception. On the nationalist
conception, people are a qualified form of community characterized by some
strong ethnic trait such as language, race, or religion.29 David Miller defines
people as a group that has a "common identity and a shared set of social
28. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. I (Dec. 16, 1966).
29. Peri Pamir, Nationalism, Ethnicity and Democracy: Contemporary Manifestations,
2 INT'L J. PEACE STUDIES (1997), http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol2_2/pamir.htm
[https://perma.cc/K2YC-J EKG].
1130
[VOL. 52: 1123, 2015] Revising International Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
rules., 30 These groups have historically developed a relationship with the
territory and its resources. 31 On Miller's account, they have settled the
territory and improved it in ways that establish the group's title over it, to
the exclusion of outsiders.3 2 These special communal acts in the territory can
be of various kinds. They can be actual improvements, based on which
groups would establish a title over the resources in a Lockean fashion.
They could also be symbolic acts that express the importance of the territory
and its resources to the group's identity.33
A number of writers have effectively challenged this view. Anna Stilz
points out three flaws with the nationalist account. The first is that it does
not explain why the group should have title over the territory-and its
resources-and not the individuals who actually made these improvements.
Second, the nationalist account cannot explain why these improvements
grant title over the whole territory. Third, the nationalist account does not
explain why immigrant communities, like Cubans in Miami, do not get
title over the land in which they make the improvements in question.
34
To these criticisms, I add a fourth. There is a fundamental indeterminacy
in the notion of people. As a result, it is virtually impossible to distinguish
groups that can be the rightful owners of natural resources from other
groups that cannot be such rightful owners. Let us take Miller's two
definitional traits of peoplehood: to be a people, a group must have a
common identity and a shared set of rules.35 I take these to be jointly
necessary and sufficient conditions. A group does not qualify merely by
having a shred set of rules; it must also have a common identity. Common
identity is a vague concept, and any attempt to make it more precise makes
it morally unappealing. Authors mention things like religion, ethnicity,
language, and the like.36 If so, then common identity is a euphemism for
something less lofty that I will call, for want of a better term, ethnic status.
If this interpretation is correct, only groups having ethnic status can be
owners of natural resources. But groups may exhibit other types of traits,
such as allegiance to liberal values. Moreover, groups may be multi-
30. Miller, supra note 12, at 258.
31. See id. at 254
32. See id. at 264.
33. See id. at 259, 261-62.
34. Stilz, supra note 25, at 575-78.
35. See Miller, supra note 12, at 258.
36. See John M. Owen IV, Pieces of Maximal Peace: Common Identities, Common
Enemies, in STABLE PEACE AMONG NATIONS 75, 76-79 (Arie M. Kacowicz et al. eds.,
2000).
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cultural, that is, they may be composed of many different groups, each
with its own ethnic characteristics. It is arbitrary, I think, to say that these
groups do not have title over the natural resources in the territories they
inhabit. The examples Miller gives conjure up the image of an aboriginal
community attached to the land in more or less mystical and symbolic
ways.3 7 But few groups have that kind of cohesiveness. Think about the
United States, Belgium, Canada, or Spain. These states do not have
a strong common identity, but are rather made up of sub-groups with their
own identities. Under the nationalist view, these states would seemingly
not qualify as peoples and therefore would not own the natural resources
in those territories. If, on the other hand, these multi-cultural states are
deemed peoples, then the nationalist principle is empty: any group that
succeeds in establishing a legal system in a territory is a people and owns
natural resources.
An alternative view would be this: if a group has ethnic status, it owns
natural resources. If the group does not have ethnic status, then the territorial
state owns them by default. But this creates a new problem. Consider
Spain. On the nationalist view, the natural resources in the Basque
Country belong to the Basques and not to Spain, because the Basques have
ethnic status and are thus a people for purposes of the Rule. In contrast,
the Andalucians (say) do not own the natural resources in their region,
because they, seemingly, do not have the ethnic status needed to be a
people. The natural resources in Andalucia presumably belong to Spain,
the state in which the Andalucians live. The idea that I may claim a right
to X because I have an ethnic status that you do not have is, to put it mildly,
unpleasant, and certainly arbitrary. The nationalist conception stems from
a romantic conception of groups attached to their land, constructing churches,
performing ceremonies. It is hard to see why these factors, and not others,
would ground the group's title over natural resources.
For these and other reasons, recent writers have rejected the nationalist
conception and offered different definitions of people while retaining the
collectivist notion that groups, and not individuals, have ownership over
natural resources. Cara Nine has argued that collective entities can
appropriate resources in a Lockean fashion and manage these resources
across generations. 38 These entities do not have to be a people in the
nationalist sense. But collective entities still own resources and can
expropriate them from individuals for the benefit of the group.
The collectivist version of peoplehood avoids some of the problems of
the nationalist version, but it is vulnerable to different types of objection.
37. See Miller, supra note 12, at 258.
38. NINE, supra note 12, at 30-31.
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All the reasons that can be invoked in favor of collective ownership of
resources apply with greater strength to private ownership. Property rights
are beneficial because they create individual incentives for the creation of
wealth. They allow people to internalize the costs and benefits of their
decisions, a process that in turn steers individual economic decisions
toward societal benefit. These advantages are not entirely applicable to
collective property.39 Collective property often encourages central planners to
make economic decisions without incurring the costs of mistakes, thus
leading to inefficiency and impoverishment. In a system of collective property,
resources are not put to their best and highest-valued use. Managers do
not gain when the values of the resources increase and do not lose when
the values fall. Therefore, they have little incentive to heed changes in
market-revealed values. 40 Experience confirms this theoretical prediction
is confirmed by experience: history has not been kind to collective ownership.
Cara Nine's defense of a perpetual collective manager flies in the face of
what we know about the creation of wealth and individual and societal
prosperity.
Not surprisingly, governments around the world favor the view that
states have permanent sovereignty over natural resources, as the Charter
says.4 1 The reason why some documents mention peoples is that peoples
are groups that intend to become states or have the potential to do so.
Thus, the Basques are a group with irredentist claims of some sort, a kind
of proto-state. But for a variety of reasons, including reasons of stability,
proponents of this view think that sub-state groups should not have ownership
rights over these resources until and unless they become sovereign states.
After all, the Rule vests permanent sovereignty over natural resources. This
39. 1 do not regard the work of Elinor Ostrom as denying this. She demonstrated
that in many situations human beings tend to draw up sensible rules for the use of common-
pool resources, thus avoiding tragedies of the commons. She insisted, however, that such
solutions would come from neighbors who pull these resources together, not from government
imposing those solutions on them. Her analysis does not support government appropriation of
resources. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 29-57 (1990).
40. See Armen A. Alchian, Property Rights, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY, http://
www.econlib.org/library/EncfPropertyRights.html [https://perrna.cc/M8XA-5JX9] (last
visited Dec. 20, 2015). True, at a global level state ownership is arguably superior to a
global commons. See JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 10-25 (2008). A global commons would possibly be a major disaster, as it would
likely unleash a tragedy of the commons of gigantic proportions. State ownership over
resources is better than no ownership at all. But the same reasons to prefer state appropriation
to a global commons should make us prefer private over state property.
41. See SCHR1JVER, supra note 4, at 7-9.
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excludes entities that are not sovereign. The theory of title that underlies the
Rule is that the state has, externally, a right to exclude other states or foreign
persons from the use of natural resources, and, internally, the power to
exclude its own subjects from that use and decide instead-presumably for
the common good-to use the resources as the state sees fit. In the rest of
the Article, I assume that the Rule vests states with ownership over natural
resources.
Many of the reasons I gave against peoples apply to states. States are
artificial creations of individuals, and they exist for the purposes of solving
problems in pre-political social interaction. I have elsewhere stated in some
length why state ownership does not fare better than ownership by some
other collective entity.42 The Rule sanctions an unjustified grab of resources
by those in power. The purpose and effect of the Rule is to unprotect
private property by vesting ultimate title in the state (or other collective
entity). Because private property rights are essential to the pursuit of
personal projects and to the achievement of societal prosperity, the Rule,
under any of its forms, is unjust and ought to be rejected. 43 Governments
use the rhetoric of development to justify nationalization of natural resources.
They will say that they need to nationalize oil because of its importance for
national development. 44 But this is an empty statement. From an economic
standpoint, the society will most likely develop by leaving oil and other
natural resources in private hands.
More generally, I am skeptical of views that assign moral standing to
non-voluntary groups such as peoples. The only legitimate associations
are voluntary associations, and the only legitimate coercion is authorized
coercion. Surely, groups can have value for their members. Groups can
facilitate the achievement of goals that cannot be achieved individually.
But this moral value of groups holds as long as they are voluntary. Groups
are importantly disanalogous to individuals. An individual has a mind that
makes plans and weighs options, alternatives, values, and goals. Mistaken
or not, an individual attempts to lead her life in her own terms. Groups,
on the contrary, do not have minds. They are collections of individuals where
some cooperate but others dominate, exploit, and prey on others. When
individuals form a life plan, they act freely-with the usual caveats and
42. Fernando R. Tes6n, The Mystery of Territory, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Fall 2015, at
25.
43. Chris Armstrong challenges the Rule in its own terms, but he suggests at the
end of the article that the claim by states against outsiders is weak, and therefore that some
kind of international or global control would be preferable. See Armstrong, supra note 20,
at 144. He never mentions private property, so I infer that state ownership, for him, is
deficient because it is incompatible with global ownership of natural resources, not because it
dispossesses individuals.
44. See Cambou & Smis, supra note 6, at 356.
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exceptions. When a ruler devises a plan for society, he coercively enrolls
others in his projects, whether many or few share his projects. To be sure,
it is possible to say that groups have ends, interests, or projects that are
not conceptually reducible to individual ends, interests, or projects. 45 But
it does not follow that rulers can coercively impose those ends on the
dissenters within the group. This means that non-voluntary collective self-
determination, that is, a collectively coerced decision about the political
status, or the cultural identity, or the economic system of a group, is morally
suspect. The realization of human ends, including those that can be realized
collectively, should in the last analysis be the result of voluntary interaction
among free individuals. There are no non-consensual goods for collectives,
nations, or tribes--over and above the goods of persons who comprise the
collectivity-that group leaders can permissibly enforce. My claim, then,
is normative, not conceptual: the only morally valuable projects are (1)
individual projects and (2) voluntary group projects. Even if we can
meaningfully speak of a group project, my claim is that (with narrow
exceptions group leaders cannot permissibly impose that project on dissenters.
This general reflection on groups bears on the Rule. If the group's value
is entirely dependent on the rights and interests of individuals, then the group
cannot hold a property title against individual owners without their consent.
I turn now to my own argument in support of private ownership of natural
resources.
II. AN INDIVIDUALIST THEORY OF NATURAL RESOURCES:
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
46
The Rule is unacceptable in any of its forms precisely because it vests
ownership in the state and relegates private property rights to a temporary,
subordinate status. The Rule institutionalizes a naked grab of resources by
those in power. My argument starts with a familiar story about the contractual
justification of the state.
1. In the state of nature, individuals can legitimately acquire land
and resources that lay in land, whether this is from the commons,
or from the unowned parts of the Earth. This is a pre-political
45. See CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY 42-58 (2011).
46. In what follows I draw freely from the companion article, Fernando R. Tes6n,
The Mystery of Territory, supra note 42.
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right to private property. This right is supported by deontological
and consequentialist reasons.
2. Individuals agree in a joint act to create civil government and
transfer to it the powers that it needs to help define the boundaries
of their rights, enforce their rights, settle controversies, and
provide genuine public goods.
3. To this end, individuals transfer to the state their executive rights,
that is, their self-help powers, but they retain most of their
substantive rights in resources. They only transfer to the state
such resources as required to discharge the state functions.
4. For these reasons, and for additional empirical reasons, the
state, to be just, must exercise its functions constrained by the
imperative to respect private property.
5. As a result, the Rule, which vests title in the state and not in
private owners, is unjust.
On the contractarian view, individuals in the state of nature confront a
number of problems in interaction. People have natural rights to life,
liberty, and property, but when controversies arise among them, they must
rely on self-help. Neighbors might disagree in good faith disagree about
their land boundary, but if there is no umpire to settle the disagreement,
they will often resort to force. For this and other reasons, individuals in
the state of nature agree to curtail their unlimited liberty in order to secure
their co-existence in civil society. To this end, they create civil government.
In the Lockean tradition, government is limited. This means that people
transfer the powers that the state needs to fulfill its delegated functions.
Individuals accept some limitation to their liberty for the sake of free
government, but they do not agree to a complete surrender of their liberty
to the sovereign. Thus, the people retain their basic rights to free speech,
freedom of religion, freedom against arbitrary arrest, freedom of conscience,
and so on. If, as Locke believed, people have a natural right to property,
then there is no reason within this logic why people would surrender their
entire property to the state. In other words, if the social contract metaphor
justifies the Bill of Rights, it also justifies private property. There is no
principled reason why individuals would surrender their property to the
state, any more than they would surrender their right to free expression to
the state. The social contract metaphor may explain why individuals would
surrender some property to the state, but it does not justify the surrender
of the entirety of the natural resources they own as part of their land rights.
Just as the traditional liberal rights are not surrendered to the state, so
property is not surrendered to the state.
A Lockean contractarian view, then, fails to justify the Rule. Natural
resources do not belong to the state. They belong to individuals, unless
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they actually transferred them to the state or justice requires such transfer.
The Rule treats the state as the original owner of resources, so it must
presuppose that the nation-people, state-precedes the individual. But
if the state and other collective entities are artificial human creations, then
the Rule cannot be right, since individuals exist prior to the state. The
state may end up owning those resources-in trust-only if they have
been delegated in some fashion by the original parties to the social contract,
the individuals. The argument requires development in several directions.
III. WHY THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IS A NATURAL RIGHT
Property rights are justified by both deontological and consequentialist
reasons. Autonomous action has a constitutive spatial dimension. Our
actions are physical actions; they necessarily take place in a certain place
at a certain time.47 Free persons must be entitled to make decisions within
a certain sphere defined in spatial-temporal terms. 48 Property rights allow
persons to control parcels of time and space, and as such, they offer
persons the protected ability to make their own decisions and thus pursue
their projects. The literature has mostly emphasized the economic advantages
of property rights. However, property rights are valuable for non-economic
reasons as well. They are central to the free pursuit of personal projects.
The common idea that traditional liberal rights such as free speech, personal
integrity, and religious freedom are inherent to human beings, while property
rights are not, is mistaken. The same reasons that justify the traditional liberal
Bill of Rights justifies property rights. This is because rights are tools to
demarcate spheres of freedom. Persons get to exclude others from their
choices with respect to that protected sphere. 49 Thus, the much-maligned
right to exclude that characterizes property is one its virtues. It allows the
owner to prevent others from setting ends to the thing owned, a privilege
that should belong only to the owner.
The consequentialist considerations that support private property rights
are well known. Private property rights generate individual and societal
prosperity. They enable producers to enjoy the benefits of productive effort
47. Here I rely on Fernando R. Tes6n and Bas van der Vossen, Respecting People
as Owners (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
48. This formulation follows the excellent discussion in HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY
ON RIGHTS 91 (1994).
49. See D. Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 36,
40-41,69 (2009).
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by creating economic value in excess of the original holdings. Property
rights allow persons to internalize the costs and benefits of their decisions,
thus realizing the gains from trade. They convert negative-sum games to
positive-sum games, thus allowing society to flourish as a cooperative
venture.50 This is particularly important in the context of the Rule. The
empirical evidence unquestionably shows a strong correlation between
market-friendly institutions and economic prosperity.5 1 States that have
abused the power vested in them by the Rule by massively appropriating
means of production and the entirety of resources have been invariably
unsuccessful. Of course, these matters are relative: some states that have
appropriated natural resources have done relatively well by upholding
robust markets elsewhere. However, the Rule gives carte blanche to bad,
inefficient, and corrupt regimes to expropriate resources at will. Private
property rights are essential for robust markets. International law, via the
Rule, expressly unprotects those rights.
A consequence of these economic considerations is that a successful
society must be capitalist, and that therefore global justice, to the extent
that it cares about wealth creation and the alleviation of poverty, requires
capitalism. 52 Capitalist societies, in this sense, include both laissez-faire
societies and a number of modern redistributive states, as long as they
recognize and protect strong markets. International law, to be just, must
create the right incentives for prosperity. The right incentives stem from
robust private property rights, themselves a precondition of markets.53 For
these economic reasons, justice requires a robust legal regime of private
property rights, including rights over natural resources.
The Rule is objectionable, then, for these economic reasons as well. By
enabling rulers to expropriate resources at will, the Rule creates bad
incentives. As indicated, one reason usually given in support of the Rule
50. See David Schmidtz, The Institution of Property, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Summer
1994, at 42, 42.
51. The correlation between robust markets and prosperity is undeniable. See
JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, at
v-vi (2013), http://www.freetheworld.com/2013/EFW2013-exec.sum.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R5P6-BCRP]; see also DAREN ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL:
THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (1 st ed., Crown Bus. 2012); DOUGLASS
C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 8, 9, 108
(1990). For a comprehensive discussion, see LOREN LOMASKY & FERNANDO R. TESON,
JUSTICE AT A DISTANCE: EXPANDING GLOBAL FREEDOM (2015).
52. The full argument for national and global freedom can be found in LOMASKY &
TESON, supra note 5 1.
53. Good institutions are inclusive when they provide incentives to engage in
productive behavior. Bad institutions are extractive when they enable governmental
depredation and generate societal zero-sum interactions. See ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON,
supra note 51, at 75, 88-90.
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is that international law should be agnostic with respect to different
economic systems. This agnosticism is a relic from the Cold War, when
the prevailing sentiment was to foster tolerance toward socialism, in part
as a way to guarantee peaceful coexistence, and in part as a recognition
that socialism may be an attractive mode of social and economic
organization. However, we now know how real socialism has fared, and
there is no reason to insist on the neutrality of the international system toward
economic regimes. The neutrality of international law toward property
rights, far from being a virtue, is a serious flaw. Political systems that suppress
or seriously hamper markets are unjust.
Saying that the right to property is a natural right is merely a way of
saying that such right does not depend on legal recognition. It is not a
privilege granted by the state. Property rights are essential to the pursuit
of personal projects, and so the denial of private property is an injustice.
This is not to say that the law cannot regulate property. The state legitimate
jurisdictional powers over a variety of things, including natural resources.
I explain why in the next section.
IV. FIRST-ORDER SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS AND SECOND-ORDER
ENFORCEMENT RIGHTS
In the state of nature, persons have two kinds of natural rights. They
have first-order substantive rights to life, liberty, and property, and they
have second-order executive rights designed to protect their first-order
rights.54 But, as Locke points out, self-help is a major inconvenience in
the state of nature. One problem is that people tend to over-punish. A second
problem is that social stability requires a reasonably precise definition of
the boundaries of our rights. Thus, it is rational for people to create an
impartial authority to solve those problems. Civil government will enforce
rights; legislate with the aim of making rights reasonably determinate and
precise; and adjudicate disputes among persons who disagree about the
extent of their rights or about whether or not rights violations have in fact
taken place. These are executive, legislative, and judicial powers, but we
can call them, for brevity, executive rights.
Now let us assume that individuals can legitimately acquire property.
For the reasons noted, in a joint act they will delegate on government the
54. The concept of executive rights originates in JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON
GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 100, 102-03 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale
Univ. Press 2003) (1690).
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executive rights they have in the state of nature. Those delegated rights
become the jurisdictional powers of the state.55 Jurisdictional powers are
the powers of the state to legislate, adjudicate, and enforce that are the
result of a joint transfer by individuals of their second-order executive
powers.56 These powers relate to many aspects of social life. With respect
to natural resources, then, the state has jurisdictional rights, not ownership
rights. The state does not own the resources. The state wields delegated
regulatory powers over them, powers that become necessary because of
the indicated difficulties of private interaction. Thus, the Rule cannot be
justified as a delegation to the state by the individual owners of these
resources. Property owners have not transferred resources to the state.
Instead, they have delegated to the state the executive powers over resources,
the power to regulate, that they cannot exercise on their own without
succumbing to the inefficiencies of the state of nature.
To these traditional functions, we can add the provision of genuine
public goods and the redistribution of resources required by justice.57 This
will require the state to control some resources. When taxes are required
to implement justice, they constitute a permissible dispossession. However,
the state can discharge these justice-required functions by taxing people
appropriately. It does not need to own resources for that purpose. The
Rule, therefore, is not justified by the standard liberal view ofjustice, even
accepting that justice requires redistribution of wealth. It is hard to see a
justification of the Rule other than the goal of strengthening government
itself. I do not know of any plausible theory of justice that recommends
strengthening government per se.
For the reasons indicated, a defensible conception of justice must
recognize private property. The state is not entitled to enforce just any
conception ofjustice. To the extent that the Rule vests title over resources
on the state, it is an unjust rule.58 The state's main job is to enforce everyone's
rights, including property rights.59 Only such a system allows persons to
pursue their projects according to their own lights. That is, they can pursue
55. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 1, 127 (1992) ("The
citizens' executive rights, once entrusted to government, become the executive power of
the state.").
56. For a discussion of surrendered and unsurrendered rights in the context of the
Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 78-86 (2005).
57. 1 do not explore here the extent of permissible expropriation of resources
required by justice. I only observe that, whatever its scope, redistribution must be consistent
with upholding healthy markets, and thus respecting private property rights. For a more
extended discussion, see Fernando R. Tes6n, The Mystery of Territory, supra note 42.
58. See Wenar, supra note 11, at 12.
59. See Cambou & Smis, supra note 6, at 359-61.
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divergent conceptions of the good-they can be free-as long as they
respect the rights of others. Property rights are as much part of justice as
free speech, religious freedom, freedom against torture, personal integrity,
and nondiscrimination. 60 The Rule, then, endorses acts of illegitimate
dispossession.
V. THE PROBLEM OF KLEPTOCRACIES
Not all writers who defend the Rule support a right of government to
seize resources at will. LeifWenar, for example, maintains that governments
may appropriate resources only if the people have transferred those
resources to the government by democratic vote. 61 Wenar deserves credit
for having flagged the problem of governmental theft. However, he does
not go far enough. The reason is that a group may steal resources from
the legitimate owner. If I legitimately own my tomatoes, then the group's
vote to transfer my tomatoes to the government cannot morally justify
such transfer, unless it is assumed that the group already owns those
tomatoes. While a majoritarian decision to dispossess legitimate owners
might be less problematic than a dictatorial decision to do so, it may still
be open to question. If a right can be cancelled whenever the majority
thinks doing so is a good idea, then it is not a right. Of course, property
rights do not trump everything, but the state is not the owner of resources,
and thus it cannot decree expropriation in a manner not licensed by the
original delegation.
Put differently: Wenar assumes that the first part of the Rule, that the
group has title over natural resources, is correct. His aim is to denounce
the frequent violation of the second part of the Rule, that governments
must exploit natural resources for the benefit of the people.62 In contrast,
I deny the first part of the rule. But I agree with Wenar that once the
government has grabbed those resources-illegitimately, in my view-it
must use them for the benefit of the subjects. In the real world, the degree
of compliance with the second part of the Rule helps us distinguish good
governments from bad ones. 63
This problem is not merely theoretical, as shown by the proliferation of
kleptocracies. A kleptocracy is a state that systematically steals from its
60. See Barros, supra note 49, at 69.
61. See Wenar, supra note 11, at 19-22.
62. See id. at 12-13, 32.
63. See id. at 23-25 (discussing the Freedom House rating scale.)
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citizens in order to increase its own wealth and power.64 Kleptocracies
block the mutual benefits that generate economic growth, and in doing so,
it concentrates power in ruling elites. In a kleptocracy, the government
appropriates resources, natural or not, at will. These regimes prey on those
who produce and end up harming everyone except themselves and those
who help them stay in power.65 Interestingly, kleptocracies can be democratic
and observe traditional civil rights.66 This is because, as long as they can
win elections, they do not need to put people in jail to enact confiscatory
laws. More: their ability to confiscate resources is the reason they win
elections. 67 It is called populism. 68 The global justice literature, with its
almost exclusive insistence on global redistribution, has overlooked this
serious problem. The Rule enables kleptocrats by expressly announcing that
the state owns natural resources and that they, the government, can use
and dispose of those resources at will.69 I conjecture that the prospect of
appropriating their society's natural resources is a major incentive for
politicians seeking power.7y
Justice, then, requires capitalism, perhaps accompanied with reasonable
redistribution measures. This means that, with the few exceptions noted,
resources should be privately owned. The view embodied in the Rule that
resources belong to the people unfortunately enables predatory rulers-
even democratically elected ones-who in the name of the people dispossess
legitimate owners, suppress markets, and use the stolen wealth to consolidate
their power. Legal systems where the state owns resources, such as various
forms of socialism and property-owning democracy, popular as they are
in academic circles and in the corridors of power, are simply unjust.
64. See THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1971) (defining Kleptocracy
as "a ruling body or order of thieves").
65. See SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, LEFT BEHIND: LATIN AMERICA AND THE FALSE
PROMISE OF POPULISM (2010). For the case of Argentina, see Roger Cohen, Opinion, Cry
for Me, Argentina, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/
opinion/28iht-edcohen28.html?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/GQ56-US5X] and The Tragedy of
Argentina: A Century of Decline, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 15, 2014, 3:59 PM), http://
www.economist.com/news/briefing/21596582-one-hundred-years-ago-argentina-was-future-
what-went-wrong-century-decline [https://perma.cc/CH74-VR2W]. For Venezuela, see
Mois~s Naim, Opinion, Chavez Will Leave Behind an Economic Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
8, 2013, 3:12 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/03/venezuela-post-
chavez/chavez-will-leave-behind-an-economic-crisis [https://perma.cc/F4YH-QFAW].
66. LOMASKY & TES6N, supra note 51.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. This is the place to note a serious omission in the global justice literature: the
failure to take into account government failure as predicted by the public choice literature.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE
In previous writings, I have argued that justice requires free trade.7 1
Trade barriers reduce national and global wealth, aggravate poverty, and
reward and punish the undeserving. Here I examine the relevance of the
Rule for trade. We saw that LeifWenar thinks that governments may own
resources, and therefore legitimately trade them, only if the people transferred
those resources democratically. Because I do not agree with collective
ownership, I do not agree either with every majoritarian transfer of resources.
My view is that individuals are the proper agents of trade. International
trade should ideally take place among buyers and sellers acting across
borders. This elementary fact has been obscured by the emphasis on national
gains from trade. This nationalistic emphasis is present in classical writers
such as Smith and Ricardo, as well as modem trade theorists. But there
is no reason to think that the gains of trade are important for states. They
are important for human beings, and only secondarily for states. On the
account I favor, the government can trade resources only if their legitimate
owners have individually transferred them or if justice requires the
transfer-although I suggested that the state does not need to own resources to
discharge its legitimate functions. Under my view, then, the Rule must be
rejected: governments do not own natural resources. The outcome of a
trade transaction is legitimate if the parties to the transaction legitimately
own the traded goods. Because governments do not own the goods they
trade, the trade is tainted. Government trades on stolen property. International
trade should be among persons, among individual owners located in different
parts of the globe, and it should be free. In the real world, of course, there
is a constant tension between private parties who wish to trade, governments
who wish a big chunk of the gains of trade, and private rent-seekers who
thrive under governmental largesse that protects them against competition.
To the extent that the liberalization rules promoted by the World Trade
Organization tend toward long-term privatization of trade, then it is a
relatively beneficial institution.
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71. See Fernando R. Tes6n, Why Free Trade Is Required by Justice, Soc. PHIL. &
POL., Jan. 2012, at 126, 126; see also Fernando R. Tes6n & Jonathan Klick, Global Justice
and Trade, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 217, 232 (Chios
Carmody et al. eds., 2012).
VII. HUMANITY AS THE OWNER
A number of writers have argued that the world's resources belong in
common to humanity. None other than John Locke held this view: "God,
who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason
to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. '7 2 The
idea of humanity as the owner of global resources can be interpreted in an
at least two ways.
Under the first interpretation, humanity has a right to strong ownership.
All the individuals on Earth really own in common its resources, that is,
humanity has the whole bundle of rights constitutive of property. This
means that states have no sovereign rights over resources and individuals
have no private property rights over resources. This approach is compatible
with recognizing, as a matter of convention, rights of ownership or property
to states or individuals. But these rights are always revocable. If world
government is established, then it could, on behalf of humanity, expropriate
resources and redistribute them at will. Those powers may be tempered
by requirements of due process and respect for the rule of law, but neither
states nor individuals have ownership claims on the resources: they have
mere possession. The world government can decide to expropriate the oil
in Norway and the United States, whether possessed by states or by
individuals, in order to alleviate poverty elsewhere. I think this system
would be worse than the one we discussed so far, which grants resource
ownership to states. It is inconsistent with justice and sound economics,
and it would predictably lead to widespread poverty and stagnation.
However, I will not pursue it further.
The second and more plausible interpretation of humanity-as-owner
regards humanity as owner in a weak sense. On this view, humanity owns
the resources of the Earth in the sense that all individuals have a claim to
satisfy their basic needs, even in the light of the legitimate claims of
appropriation pressed by others. Mathias Risse has defended this view,
which he calls common ownership.
According to Risse, Earth as a whole is collectively owned.73 While
states may adopt, internally, many different ownership systems, "humanity's
collective ownership formulates a standing demand on all groups to occupy
the earth in a manner that respects the equal status of all individuals with
regard to original resources."74 Risse lists four conceptions of ownership of
the Earth's resources: no ownership, joint ownership, common ownership,
72. LOCKE, supra note 54, at 100, 111. For a modem treatment, see MATHIAS RISSE,
ON GLOBAL JUSTICE 108 (2012).
73. See RISSE, supra note 72, at 89.
74. Id. at 109.
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and private ownership. No ownership entails that individuals may appropriate
resources without limits. Under joint ownership, acquisition requires the
consent of every co-owner. Common ownership-in Risse's version-
means that "all co-owners ought to have an equal right opportunity to satisfy
basic needs[.],, 75 Everyone has an equal status with respect to resources;
this translates in a claim to have their basic needs satisfied. Following
Grotius, Risse accepts that states can claim portions of the Earth; as long
as they comply with the proviso that these sovereignty claims must be
conditioned by the requirement that other persons that inhabit the globe
satisfy their basic needs.
76
Risse's attitude toward private property is unclear. On one hand, for
Risse private property rights are mere conventions.77 This is also buttressed
by his assertion that different states may enforce different property systems
in their territories as long as they respect the constraint imposed by
common ownership-that all co-owners must have the opportunity to
meet basic needs.78 On the other hand, Risse says that common ownership
is accompanied by a theory of privatization, that is, a theory of "how to
derive private ownership from. . . common ownership" (my emphasis).
But private individuals do not have any private property rights against the
state if the state has the stronger claim on the resources. The thesis of
common ownership then is mainly concerned with claims that foreigners
may have against the resources laying within states. It is not concerned
with the legitimate claims that domestic private owners may have against
the state.
Consequently, Risse's position, if I understand it correctly, boils down
to three claims. First, resources are owned in common by humanity. Second,
either states or individuals may stake ownership claims over those resources.
Third, these claims are conditional on satisfying the requirement that co-
owners must have the opportunity to satisfy their basic needs. In particular,
Risse rejects the view that co-owners are entitled to an equal share of what
is collectively owned.
This raises a new ambiguity, however. Risse makes inconsistent claims
with respect to private property. He makes the stronger claim that states
or individuals are entitled to stake property claims on resources (to take
75. Id. at 111.
76. 1 am less confident than Risse that his view is supported by Grotius, because for
Grotius appropriation creates a right of ownership unimpeded by any proviso.
77. RiSSE, supra note 72, at 112.
78. Id.
1145
from the commons) only to extent that they need them for survival.79 But
he also makes the weaker claim that private appropriation is merely subject
to the condition that co-owners must have the opportunity to satisfy basic
needs. There is an obvious space between these two claims. The first
authorizes private claims only to meet basic needs. The second authorizes
all claims-even exceeding basic needs-as long as co-owners, outsiders,
retain the opportunity to satisfy theirs. Suppose the first claim is true. It is
unclear who owns the resources that are not necessary to satisfy the
appropriator's needs. Throughout his discussion, Risse makes clear that
all common ownership means is that appropriations must be constrained by
the condition he stipulates. What follows from common ownership
if appropriators are entitled to claim resources only to satisfy their needs?
Is an appropriation in excess of basic needs illegitimate? If so, what are
the consequences? Do these extra resources revert to the global co-owners?
There might be a huge supply of resources and wealth once everyone's
needs have been satisfied. It is unclear, on this account, who would have
ownership of those extra resources.
Having said this, despite the foundational differences between Risse's
account and the one this Article offers, there is an important point of
convergence. On my view, individuals, and not states, have a right of
original appropriation. They then delegate jurisdictional powers to the
state. I have suggested, but not argued for, the possibility that justice may
require redistribution of resources in order to allow persons to meet their
basic needs. Therefore, the outcome under my approach is not very different
to the outcome under Risse's approach. The states created by the social
contract have the obligation to make sure everyone's needs are satisfied.
This convergence is possible because on Risse's account of common
ownership the humanity is not really the owner. If it were, private
appropriations would be entirely provisional and precarious, and humanity-
a world government-could expropriate resources at will. Common
ownership is really a metaphor for private appropriation with a proviso.
If I had to classify my view within Risse's categories, it would resemble
no-ownership-with-proviso-a view that Risse declines to discuss, after
having rejected no-ownership-without-proviso, because he thinks it collapses
into common ownership.
Yet, the foundational differences between both approaches are important.
To me, private property rights are natural. They precede the state. They
can be explained either by postulating original common ownership with
the possibility of individuals legitimately taking from the commons with
an appropriate proviso, or by postulating no-ownership with individuals
79. Id. at 111-12.
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appropriating in the same way. The second difference is that, on my view,
states are not entitled to enforce just any system of property, whereas
Risse expressly allows for any system of property as long it complies with
the basic-needs proviso. In my view, states must enforce justice, including
perhaps, a proviso similar to the one Risse defends, in a manner consistent
with the moral and empirical reasons that underlie private property rights.
The Rule is incompatible with common ownership. The Rule, as formulated
in the documents quoted above, is quite clear that natural resources belong
to those sitting on them.80 There is no provision for what is owed to co-
owners, that is, to the rest of humanity. Perhaps supporters of common
ownership could read the Rule as tempered by the background idea of
common ownership. On this view, the Rule would be just a legal assignment
of ownership of resources done for efficiency reasons, much as the legal
assignment of individual property rights are. If so, the Rule should be
read in less absolute terms than it is written. We should insert a proviso,
perhaps, about the duties of the resource owners to share with outsiders.
Needless to say, the Rule omits any mention to any such duties. If one
accepts common ownership, then the Rule occupies a subordinate place:
the state does not really own the resources. International law would allow
states to manage them for a variety of practical reasons, but humanity as a
whole would be the ultimate owner and would be able to expropriate those
resources at any time. It is unlikely that supporters of the Rule would regard
this as a friendly amendment.
Of course, in this Article I have rejected the Rule. Is Risse's version of
common ownership better? Yes, if interpreted as allowing private
80. 1 think Risse errs when he invokes international law in support of his view. He
thinks that the high seas, Antarctica, and the outer space, are the "common heritage of all
mankind." RISSE, supra note 72, at 89. But the only area that has been declared common
heritage is the ocean's deep-sea bed. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 126,
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 321. The high seas are open to all,
subject to some constraints such as peaceful purposes and due regard for the interests of
other states. They cannot be subject to state sovereignty. See id., arts. 87-89. The status of
the outer space is similar. See Outer Space Treaty, arts. 1-2, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S.
205. Antarctica is even farther from a global commons. It is subject to a special regime
governed by a treaty that "freezes" existing sovereignty claims. See Antarctic Treaty, Dec.
1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. Of course, none of those areas is subject to private appropriation.
So the default rule in international law is the rule of permanent state sovereignty over
natural resources. The deep-sea bed comes close to a common with a redistributive
proviso. The high seas, the outer space, and Antarctica are not common heritage but areas
of common usage. All four areas are exceptions to the Rule. International law has a long
way to go to come even close to surrendering states' interest to common ownership.
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appropriation in the state of nature with the proviso that it should allow
others to satisfy basic needs. On the other hand, if common ownership is
read as indifferent between private ownership and state ownership, then it
is deficient for the reasons I have given.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The traditional position in international law has been, from the outset
that natural resources belong to the territorial state in which those resources
lay. This is reflected in the rule of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources, considered, almost without dissent, as a binding international legal
principle. The Rule, however, is in a collision course with global justice
enthusiasts, who insist that natural resources do not belong to the territorial
states but to humanity as a whole. To them, the world should resemble as
much as possible the modem welfare state. While this literature is sparse on
institutional proposals, the idea is that natural resources somehow should
be used for the benefit of all and not just for the benefit of those who sit
in them.
This Article dissents from both views. It tries to vindicate the individualist
tradition in law, philosophy, and economics.8' This tradition rescues private
property rights as the engine of prosperity and as an important component
of human freedom. It assigns natural resources, not to ruling elites or
bloated international bureaucracies, but to individuals who acquire them,
who alone are in a position to internalize the costs and benefits of their
use. This Article coheres with sound economics and aligns itself with
normative and methodological individualism. The rule of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, in contrast, was written by governments
to serve their own interests, namely to be able to access the Earth's riches,
often to benefit themselves rather than their subjects. From a philosophical
standpoint, this Article follows in the liberal social contract tradition,
where states, governments, and rulers are mere servants of the people, and
not the other way around. A final comment: contrary to what is often said,
I am convinced that the individualist approach is the truly humanitarian
view. Strong and secure property rights are more likely to alleviate world
poverty than redistributive schemes that pay no heed to the importance of
wealth creation. Property rights create wealth, and only by creating wealth
can a rule on natural resources serve the needs of all persons in the globe.
1148
81. For a comprehensive treatment, see LOMASKY & TESON, supra note 51.
